10.27.2009 Source: Richard Clarke, From the November/December issue of The National Interest.
. . . Maybe then he will ask policy questions such as: How does deterrence work in cyber war when our capabilities are secret and our weapons undemonstrated? Should we, because of our own vulnerabilities to cyber attack, initiate cyber-arms-limitation talks, instead of our current policy of opposing them? Can arms control work in cyberspace when verification is so difficult? Strategic defense was not possible in nuclear strategy, despite Ronald Reagan’s best efforts, but does that also apply to cyber war? Can public discussion, international norms and established lines of communication result in some sort of risk-reduction process to address the issues of crisis instability that seem to be inherent in cyber war? Are the generals and admirals at Cyber Command more thoughtful than SAC’s leaders were at the advent of the era of strategic nuclear war? We would like to think so, but in the absence of public-policy development, the American people cannot know the answer to that or to the many other questions that the possibility of cyber war raises. It is time for that public discussion.